Brief

SSHole (CVE-2026-123158): a locked account accepts a password over SSH, on a stock OpenSSH + Alpine (musl) box, which delivers an authentication-logic bug for years. This chamber walks you through it one step at a time so you see why it works.

You start as bob (password correct-horse-battery). Two other accounts, alice and root, are locked with * in /etc/shadow and should never accept a password.

Four flags, scored separately:

  1. Foothold — log in as bob and read ~/flag1.
  2. The 256-byte wall — run /opt/sshole/crypt-oracle (pipe a password to its stdin) and make musl's crypt() fail. It explains itself and hands you the flag.
  3. The bypass — log in over SSH as the locked account alice.
  4. Blast radius — the same trick logs you in as root.

Everything you need is on the box. Capture flags in form of DAEDALUS{...} to pwn the chamber.

Hints

Open them one at a time
Hint 1

The fix is OpenSSH 10.6p2, or PasswordAuthentication no.

Details

Released
2026-11-10
CVE
CVE-2026-123158
References
sshhole.com
Writeups
None yet
Author
axura
Tags
sshopensshmuslauthenticationalpine

Reproduces the SSHole disclosure by Ozgun Kultekin (sshhole.com); reference PoC github.com/oz9un/sshole (MIT). Built on OpenSSH (BSD) and Alpine/musl. The chamber pins apre-fix OpenSSH 9.9p1 and keeps the stored hash stable across pick_salt(), matching realvulnerable distro builds.